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Abstract.  This paper recovers micro cost schedules of consumers’ payment 
instruments from aggregate transaction costs.  We assume that only two moments of 
the size distribution of payments matter: the number and volume of transactions.  
These variables explain the transaction costs of currency and debit card payments 
with much precision for a representative 1998 sample of Dutch retailers.  The results 
imply that low fixed transaction costs favor currency for small transactions, while low 
variable transaction costs favor debit card payments for large transactions.  The 
switch point is 30 Euros, but including the hidden costs of currency would lower it to 
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This study2 assesses the roles costs and fees play in the choice between currency 
and electronic payments in the Dutch payment system, where the relevant choice is 
between currency and electronic debit cards, the prevailing media of exchange in 
North-Western Europe (unlike the U.S. and the U.K.). Using our access to a wealth of 
Dutch payment cost data, we are able to build upon the few cost analyses of payment 
systems in the academic literature. 
The distinction that drives the choice of payment mode is that between fixed and 
variable costs.  Currency has low fixed but high variable cost and, therefore, is cost 
effective for small payments.  Electronic payments have high fixed but low variable 
costs and, therefore, are cost effective for big payments.  The distinction can be 
visualized by a pair of straight cost lines, one for currency with a low vertical 
intercept but a steep slope, and one for debit cards with high vertical intercept, but a 
flat slope.   
The main contribution of this paper is the recovery of such micro cost schedules 
from aggregate transaction costs at the level of the retailer.  The main insight is that 
an ordinary regression framework with a constant term for the fixed cost and a 
coefficient for the variable cost should not be imposed, but at best emerge from an 
analysis of a cost function at the aggregate level of the firm.                  
The organization of the paper is as follows.  The next section discusses the 
literature. Then section 2 sets up a general framework for payment costs and derives 
micro cost schedules.  Section 3 discusses and implements the estimation of payment 
costs.  Section 4 takes up the tricky yet important issue of social costs.  Section 5 





Our discussion of the literature is directed towards our cost-based approach to 
the choice of payment instrument.  For a more comprehensive review of the payment 
literature we refer to Hancock and Humphrey (1998). 
The choice of payment instrument has been analyzed primarily from the 
perspective of the consumer.  Daniels and Murphy (1994) find that the increased 
                                                 
2 The research was commissioned by the Dutch public retail organization, HBD.  We gratefully 
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availability of new technologies, particularly, automatic teller machines, has lowered 
household demand for currency.  Duca and Whitesell (1995) find that credit card 
ownership reduces checking balances and money fund balances.  Boeschoten (1998) 
uses a number of variables to explain the choice of payment mode and finds that the 
amount to be paid dominates.   
The aforementioned studies pay little attention to costs.  There may be a good 
reason for this, as Hancock and Humphrey (1998, p. 1612) observe: 
 
“Data on payment costs are fragmented and often proprietary, so no cross-
section or time-series data exists on the payment costs incurred by payors, 
payees or banks.”   
 
Only limited information is available from surveys and, therefore, few empirical 
papers explore this area.  Some interesting findings are reported however in 
Humphrey, Pulley and Vesala (2000), who argue that electronic payment methods 
cost only around one third to one half as much as checks, but that the relative costs are 
not reflected in the prices banks charge, especially not in the U.S.  Furthermore, 
analyzing Norwegian data, Humphrey, Kim and Vale (2000) find that payment users 
are quite sensitive to the relative prices.  It should be mentioned though that even in 
Norway the bank price-to-cost ratio varies quite a bit between payment instruments.  
In this paper we attempt to replace prices or user costs with the underlying 
production costs.  This approach does not permit us to explain observed consumers’ 
behavior, but it does enable us to map the efficient choice of payment instrument as a 
function of transaction size.  This insight is obviously a useful guide for retailers and 
policy makers in designing price and non-price instruments for the consumers’ choice 
of payment instrument.   
 
 
2. The theory of payment costs 
 
We develop a general model of medium of exchange, which induces a trade-off 
between fixed and variable costs across transaction technologies; and is flexible 
enough to lend itself for estimation.  We follow the framework of Whitesell (1989, 
                                                                                                                                            
acknowledge their support.  
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1992), but free his model of a number of restrictions.  Whitesell considers a 
representative consumer who makes large numbers of transactions.  The choice of 
payment medium depends only on the size (dollar value) of a transaction—not on the 
particular commodities purchased. In contrast, we do not focus on a consumer’s 
rational choice of a unique payment instrument for each transaction size, but on the 
costs of different payment instruments for an additional transaction, given the 
retailer’s distributions of transaction sizes (for the modes of payments).  A transaction 
of any size, , can be paid by instrument i, where i is currency or debit card, and the 
numbers of these transactions are denoted by ni().  Whitesell (1992) would let i = 
currency, check, or credit card.3 
The total costs associated with transactions paid through medium i is in its most 
general form a function of the entire frequency distribution, ni: Ci(ni).  We assume, 
however, that only two moments of the distribution matter, namely the number and 
the volume of transactions.  The number of transactions is ni()d and the volume of 
transactions is  ni()d.  The cost function is thus: 
 
Ci(ni) = Fi[ ni()d ,  ni()d].                  (1) 
 
An important example is the linear case, 
 
Fi(x,y) = ix + iy,        (2) 
 
which turns (1) into 
 
Ci = i ni()d + i ni()d.       (3)  
 
In (3) costs are additively separable with respect to transaction size.  Cost 
minimization can, therefore, be performed pointwise (per transaction size).  The linear 
specification encompasses that of Whitesell (1992).  He fixes the frequency 
distribution by the assumption ni() = Y, where Y is a constant, and specifies the 
                                                 
3 Notational warning: Whitesell (1992) uses no index for payment medium.  He temporarily uses index 
i = 1,...,I  for transaction size (taking discrete values); his I is some huge number, whereas our index 
corresponds to the payment instrument and takes only two or three values.   
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integrands in the two terms in (3) as displayed in Table 1, where n is in the first term 
and Y in the second. 
 
TABLE 1  
Payment Medium Cost Terms n Cost Terms Y 
Currency b -an  rY 
Check fn sY 
Credit Card n 0 
  
Source: Whitesell (1992, Table 1).  In his terminology, cost terms n and Y represent the transaction 
and holding costs, respectively, for checks and credit cards.  For currency he includes term b in the 
transaction cost.  The specification involves two normalizations.  (i) All transactions are measured as 
incremental costs, net of the time and bookkeeping cost of check writing.  (ii) The incremental cost of 
using a credit card, including account verification delays, but net of the above time and bookkeeping 
cost, is normalized at unity.   
 
 
Whitesell’s specification of the payment frequency distribution – assuming 
constant sales for each size of transaction – may be convenient for theoretical 
tractability, but is drastic.  We are able to dispense with this restriction and proceed 
without making a distributional assumption in equation (1).  The trick is to 
differentiate costs with respect to the numbers of transactions, ni(), and to use the 
chain rule.  Thus, the incremental costs of a payment of size  are given by 
 
ICi() =   F1i’( ni()d , ni()d ) + F2i’( ni()d , ni()d) · .   (4) 
 
Here the primes and subscripts are standard notation for partial derivatives.  
Notice that once the transaction size is the perceived variable (rather than the 
frequency), the first term in (4) (F1i’) represents the fixed cost, whereas the second 
term in (4) (F2i’ · ) represents variable cost of the additional payment.  In the linear 
case—see equation (2)—the fixed cost is i, the unit variable cost is i, and (4) 
becomes    
 
ICi() =   i + i .                     (5) 
 
 6 
For small transactions, incremental cost is minimized if the medium with the 
lowest fixed cost, i, is used; while for large transactions, incremental cost is 
minimized if the medium with the lowest variable cost, j, is used.4  
For illustration, when the coefficients are denoted as in Table 1, cost 
minimization implies that small transactions should be conducted with currency (for 
which  is negative) and large transactions with a credit card (for which  is zero).  
Similarly, in the Dutch situation, where the dominant media of exchange are currency 
and debit cards, it would be optimal to have small transactions conducted by means of 
currency and large transactions by debit cards. 
Letting i = 1, 2 denote currency and debit card, respectively, we expect 1 < 2 
and 1 > 2.  The switch point, *, where currency and debit card costs are just equal, 
is determined by the following condition:  
 
IC1(*) =  IC2(*).                      (6) 
 
Substituting (5) into (6), we obtain the value of the switch point, 
 
 * = (2 – 1)/(1 – 2).        (7) 
 
 
3. The estimation of payment costs 
 
There are two ways to estimate the cost parameters.  One is to confine the 
analysis to the consumer side of the economy, and to work with (subjectively) 
perceived costs.  A good example is Humphrey, Pulley, and Vesala (1996).  They find 
a negative effect of user costs on the use of giro and credit cards, but not on checks 
and debit cards; country variation is explained by cultural and institutional factors.  
Using a more micro-econometric analysis, Boeschoten (1998) finds that the choice of 
payment medium is dominated by the size of the transaction, but he does not estimate 
user costs.  A fundamental difficulty with an exclusive demand approach is that cost 
parameters are estimated to fit demand, assuming cost minimizing behavior.  As such, 
it is hard to draw efficiency conclusions. 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking this rule is myopic.  However, in the linear case, (2), the rule is also rational. 
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The second approach to estimate cost parameters is to use supply-side data on 
transaction costs, which facilitates the analysis of technology shocks and of non-
economic behavior (dominated by cultural and institutional factors).  While most 
economists prefer this approach, it is difficult to obtain the needed data.  Fortunately 
we have access to a unique dataset and can adopt the latter approach.  
In the supply-side approach it is customary to use private cost data.  However, it 
can be extended to factor in the hidden costs.  In particular, currency has implicit cost 
components in the form of subsidies from the central bank5 and, at least in the 
Netherlands and some other countries, from commercial banks as well.6 Our 
framework allows us to compare market payment characteristics and optimal ones. 
We estimate equation (3) with an additive error term by ordinary least squares.  
Thus, for currency and debit card payments we regress the transaction costs on the 
number of transactions and the volume of transactions (sales).  The data used in this 
study have been collected by EIM (Economic Institute Middle and small-sized 
enterprises) from a representative sample of Dutch retailers in 1998.  The data are 
described in Jaarsma and van Rijt-Veltman (1999) and have been kindly made 
available to us in electronic form.  For each retailer the data gives the annual totals on 
the use of each payment instrument in 1998, implying that only data on the total 
number of transactions, total sales, and total costs associated with the use of each 
payment instrument by a retailer, but no distribution of sales within each separate 
shop is available. Table 2 gives a comparison of the average cost per transaction and 
average cost per sale for the two payment media.7 As we can see, the cost of one 
transaction paid by currency is on average smaller than that for a debit-card 
transaction, while the opposite holds for the transaction cost per 100 Euros of 
revenue.  
                                                 
5 Maintaining the security of notes implies the necessity of enhancing the design of new notes every 
several years. For example, just after redesigning its currency in 1996, the U.S. is redesigning its 
currency again to try to keep ahead of counterfeiters. (The joint press release of the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System and the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (June 20, 2002) is posted on: 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/other/2002/20020620/default.htm.) 
6 Another “hidden” or social cost of currency is that it abets the underground economy, which entails 
social costs in the form of tax evasion and law breaking.  On the other hand, currency does provide 
some benefits in the form of privacy. 
7 The reported average costs per transaction are estimated as ratios of the corresponding median values 
of cost and transaction number presented in Table 4. Similarly, the average costs per 100 Euros of sales 
are estimated as ratios of the corresponding medians from Table 4. 
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TABLE 2  
Payment Medium Average cost per  
100 Euros of sales  
Average cost per 
transaction (in Euros) 
Currency  0.90 0.09 
Debit cards 0.53 0.14 
 
 
The transaction costs for currency pertain to cash management, transport, 
depositing, back-office operations, and theft.  The debit card costs pertain to the 
installation, maintenance, and modernization of POS machines (point of sale), and 
rent foregone.  Table 3 shows the composition of payment costs for currency and for 
debit cards.  (Notice, however, that estimation of (3) requires no breakdown.) 
  
TABLE 3 
 Currency8 Debit cards 
Data communication - 24.7% 
Subscription  - 10.7% 
Transaction fees - 34.8% 
POS machines - 27.7% 
Rent foregone 2.9% 2.1% 
Transport 22.3% - 
Depositing 22.5% - 
Back-office operations 45.2% - 
Theft 7.1% - 
TOTAL 100% 100% 
 
Source: ten Raa and Shestalova  (2001) 
 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics for the original samples of 215 currency 
observations and the 96 debit cards observations.9 
                                                 
8 In this table the column “Currency” includes checks, which have a share of less than 1.5%. 
9 We had to fill a gap in the information on currency.  In the original dataset the information on 
transportation cost were available for 24 shops only.  We found a nearly linear relationship between 
total sales and transportation costs.   The results of the OLS regression were used to impute the 
transportation costs of the other shops in the sample.   The cost of back-office was not readily available 
and we have computed it as the number of hours spent on back-office activities multiplied by an hourly 






Ten currency observations have been excluded because of incomparability 
(many times the size of the rest of the sample).  Similarly, two extremely large debit 
card observations have been excluded because of incomparability of their costs per 
transaction. 10 
  
Estimating equation (3) using the resulting sample yields the regression results 
presented in Table 5.11 
 
TABLE 5 
Payment Medium Transactions Number Coefficient 
 (t-statistics)12 
Sales Coefficient  
 (t-statistics) 
Currency 
(Radj2 = 0.72) 
0.01915** 
(5.41, 1.43, 1.34) 
0.00252** 
(10.27, 3.22, 2.73) 
Debit Card  
(Radj2 = 0.68) 
0.05970** 
(5.37, 2.29, 2.07) 
0.00117** 
(3.42, 1.44, 1.33) 
 
                                                 
10 K. Jaarsma commented that EIM made a similar exclusion, considering the observations unreliable 
(Jaarsma and Veltman, 1999). 
11 The use of a linear specification with the restriction that the constant term is equal to zero not only 
agrees with theory (Table 1), but also with the data for currency, as well as for debit cards. More 
precisely, the estimation including a constant term reproduces the estimates reported in Table 5 up to 
the third digit for debit card coefficients and for the sales coefficient of currency, and up to the second 
digit for the transactions number coefficients of currency, which is all well within the confidence 
intervals.  The results of the estimation of a more general cost function including second-order terms 
are insignificant. Even if they were significant, it would be difficult to incorporate them in the analysis, 
as coefficients would vary across shops and, therefore, switch ‘points’ would be functions of shop 
characteristics. 
12 The first t-statistic is for OLS, the second for White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity consistent covariance 
matrix estimation, and the third for Newey-West (1987) HAC consistent covariance matrix estimation. 
Currency Mean  Median Maximum  Minimum Std. Dev. 
Total sales (Euro) 6619951 248660 292000000 15066 30089313 
Number of transactions  535852 23760 30613200 36 2899342 




Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
Total sales (Euro) 5893130 154265 83356589 6178 15271107 
Number of transactions 187966 6000 2499000 84 489387 
Cost (Euro) 24725 818 924739 59 102327 
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The first row in Table 5 shows that an additional private currency transaction 
costs around 2 Eurocents plus a quarter Eurocent per Euro.  The second row in Table 
5 shows that an additional debit card transaction costs around 6 Eurocents plus a tenth 
Eurocent per Euro.  The t-statistics show that all these coefficients are highly 
significant in the OLS regressions, even at the 1% level, as indicated by the ** 
superscripts. 
The results imply the expected trade-off between fixed and variable costs.  The 
low fixed transaction costs of currency favor this medium for small transactions.  The 
low variable transaction costs favor debit cards for large transactions.  Substitution of 
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Figure 1.  Incremental private costs of a currency transaction and of a debit card 
transaction. 
 
Notice that the two lines in Figure 1 (embodying the results of Table 5) are quite 
flat.  An upward shift of the flattest line (representing debit cards) by 0.0045 would 
push the intersection point to 33 Euros.  This scenario illustrates the effect of an 
increase of the POS tariff by 0.45 Eurocent (or 1 Dutch cent), considered by the 




4. Extension to social costs 
 
Private costs of the payment system are incurred directly by sellers (retail), who 
eventually pass it on to the buyers (consumers).  The Dutch retail costs of the 
currency medium amount to 0.90% of sales according to Table 2.  Consumers face 
virtually no costs in the Netherlands, where banks fully subsidize currency 
withdrawals and few retailers charge a debit card fee.  The extension to social costs 
merely involves the inclusion of commercial and central bank costs.  Now Interpay 
(2000) claims that the Dutch fees for the use of POS are cost neutral.  Hence we limit 
our modification of costs to the medium of currency.  We also limit bank costs to the 
costs of ATM’s (automatic teller machines).  Unfortunately, the Dutch central bank 
has not been forthcoming with cost data and, therefore, we make use of a Norwegian 
proxy.  The calculations are performed in Euros.   
The bank costs of ATM use in Norway amount 0.43 Euro per ATM transaction 
according to Flatraaker and Robinson (1995).13  On average Dutch ATM users 
withdraw 102 Euros per time according to Boeschoten (1998).  Hence the bank costs 
of currency per 100 Euros can be estimated as  (100/102 x 0.43 Euro =) 0.42 Euro or 
0.42%. Adding the bank costs (0.42%) of currency use to our 0.90% retail cost 
estimate yields a total or social cost of currency use equal to 1.32% of sales.14  In 
other words, the social costs of currency are 47% greater than the private costs (as 
1.32/0.90 = 1.47). 
Accounting for social cost in Figure 2 (that is the steeper line) makes the 
currency cost still steeper and, therefore, would push the intersection point leftward to 
13 Euros.  Figure 3 displays the implied social costs.  
 
 
                                                 
13 By using this 1994 statistic, we implicitly assume that productivity improvements in ATM 
technology have offset any incremental costs associated with inflation between 1994 and 1998. 
14 G. Øwre of Norges Bank kindly wrote us the following on November 28, 2000.  ‘Given that the 
assumption of constant costs to scale is robust, you could say that the cost of cash is 1.87%, and if 
some costs are kept out, an estimate of 2% would not be too far off.’  These remarks pertain to the 
Norwegian payment system.  We have decided to use our more conservative estimate of 1.32% for the 








0 20 40 60 80 100



















From the viewpoint of private costs (Figure 1), it is in the interest of retailers to 
discourage the use of debit cards for payments under 30 Euros.  Some Dutch retailers 
charge a fee for small debit card payments indeed, but typically at the lower cut-off 
point of 11-13 Euros (that is Dfl 25 or 30 in the old currency).  It is amazing to see 
how close this policy is to the socially optimal switch point of 13 Euros (see Figure 
2).  Two opposite distortions thus appear to roughly offset each other, namely the 
implicit bank subsidies of currency and the implicit retail subsidies of debit cards. 
 
 
5. Extension to other media of exchange 
 
The newest form of payment is the electronic purse, which we have not 
analyzed due to a lack of data.  The main Dutch retailer announced the introduction of 
the electronic purse on November 15, 2001. We have some observations, but not 
enough to obtain significant results. 
What will matter is the fixed and variable cost of electronic purse payments 
relative to currency and debit card payments.  The fixed cost will be higher than that 
of currency, which requires no fancy machines, but lower than that of debit cards, of 
which the machines must be able to telecommunicate.  The use of an electronic purse 
 13 
is swift and safe, and thus carries less variable cost than of currency.  However, it is a 
purse and must be filled and emptied.  Eventually the variable costs will outweigh 
those of the debit card.  
Graphically we have a third, intermediate cost line.  The switch point between 
currency and debit card determined in the previous sections will be replaced by two 
new switch points, a lower one between currency and electronic purse, and a higher 
one between electronic purse and debit card.   
In principle, these modifications apply not only to the private costs (Figure 1), 
but also to the social costs (Figure 2).  However, since the social costs differ from the 
private costs only for currency, it is very well possible that the inclusion of social 
costs lifts the currency cost curve over the intersection point of the electronic purse 
and debit card curves.  In short, the combination of the electronic purse and the 
introduction of bank policies that charge currency costs to the consumers (novel in the 
Netherlands but not elsewhere) may make cash relatively more expensive, even for 
small transactions. However, there are serious doubts that the electronic purse will 
become an important or significant payment instrument in the near future. According 
to Van Hove (2000), “…retailer acceptance and consumer uptake invariably fall short 






Transaction costs are a function of the size distribution of payments.  Assuming 
that only two moments of this distribution matter, namely the number and the volume 
of payments, the partial derivatives yield the fixed and unit variable costs of 
payments.  The approach builds upon recent applied theoretic models and is flexible 
enough to allow for estimation.  Consistent with the literature, currency is found to 
have a lower fixed cost and the debit card a lower variable cost.  Estimates using 
Dutch data indicate that currency is cost effective for small payments and debit cards 
for big payments.  Accounting for private costs, the switch point is 30 Euros, but 
accounting for the hidden costs of currency, the switch point falls to 13 Euros. These 
Dutch estimates suggest that the use of debit card or electronic purse technology will 
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